In contrast to much recent work regarding the causes of European unemployment, in this paper, we emphasise the importance of capital accumulation. But unlike the few previous studies which have examined the relationship between capital stock and unemployment, we argue that what matters for the evolution of employment [and the unemployment rate] is not the absolute growth rate of a country's capital stock, but its evolution relative to other countries' capital stock. The empirical importance of the above statement is demonstrated using quarterly time-series data from 1961-1995 for Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.
I. INTRODUCTION
The received wisdom regarding the causes of the historically high unemployment rates in Europe during the last twenty years has recently been reaffirmed: "…generous unemployment benefits that are allowed to run on indefinitely…; high unionization with wages bargained collectively and no coordination between either unions or employers in wage bargaining; high overall taxes impinging on labour…;
poor educational standards at the bottom end of the labour market" [Nickell, 1997, p.72] . Accordingly, it is suggested that to fight unemployment, the European countries should (a) reduce the duration for which unemployment benefits are payable (b) erode the relative value of the minimum wage (c) restructure the payroll tax system (d) foster competition in product and labour markets (e) improve training and (f) offer the unemployed the option of turning their benefits into employment vouchers [Alogoskoufis et al., 1995, p.129-130] . Others are even more emphatic about the roots of the evil: "…the specter of unemployment that is haunting Europe will not be exorcised unless governments are prepared to undertake major reforms of the institutional setup of the labour market" [Siebert, 1997, p.53 ].
What the above mentioned studies and many others [c.f. Nickell, 1998 , Phelps and Zoega, 1998 and Sargent, 1998 ] have in common is the absence of any role for the capital stock as a determinant of unemployment. In their influential treatise on unemployment, Jackman, 1991 -LNJ [1991] hereafter -provide a justification for this omission based on a "stylized fact": the unemployment rate is untrended over the very long-term. They interpret this as suggesting that in the longterm, a country's capital stock and productivity have no impact on its unemployment rate. Otherwise unemployment should be negatively trended given the large increases in capital stock and productivity during the last century. Additionally, they show that in the context of a union model [p. 107] , equilibrium unemployment is independent of the amount of capital per capita in the economy if the production function is CobbDouglas and the benefit replacement ratio is constant.
The relationship between the capital stock and the unemployment rate has attracted the attention of a small number of economists [the earliest one being Malinvaud, 1980] . Bean [1994] provides a summary of the earlier work in this area which is mainly based on the idea of limited ex-post substitutability between capital and labour. In this work, employment is constrained by the amount of the existing capital stock. Survey evidence on capacity utilization has been used by Sneessens and DrŠze [1986] to support the idea that capital shortages create a technological constraint on employment. Nevertheless, later studies [see, DrŠze and Bean, 1990] , have questioned the assumption of limited ex-post factor substitutability and Bean [1994] concludes that capital shortages cannot be the main explanation for the rise in European unemployment. This conclusion has been challenged by two recent studies.
First, Rowthorn [1996] uses a "battle of the mark-ups" or a "competing claims" model [see Rowthorn, 1977 , Blanchard, 1986 , Layard and Nickell, 1986 and Carlin and Soskice, 1990 ] type model to argue that an increase in the capital stock reduces the ability of firms to raise prices since it creates -ceteris paribus -excess capacity. It also leads to better trade performance, which allows the real exchange rate to appreciate and real domestic income to increase. The conflict over income distribution is thus lessened and a stable rate of inflation can be achieved at a lower unemployment rate. Rowthorn's empirical analysis provides some support for this thesis.
Second Gordon [1997] finds that the countries which experienced the largest slowdowns in the growth rate of capital per potential labour hour faced the greatest increases in the unemployment rate. He also concluded that the European countries in the 1990s do not have enough capital to equip all the employees who would have had a job if unemployment rates in Europe had remained at the level of the late 1970s. The basic mechanism which Gordon uses to explain these findings is a version of the "battle-of-the-mark-ups". In this framework a wage-setting shock [due, for example, to an exogenous increase in the bargaining power of trade unions] results, initially, in a decline in employment and an increase in labour productivity. However, the marginal product of capital will fall, as the fixed stock of capital is now combined with a smaller labour input. This will in turn reduce the demand for capital and a period of disinvestment will follow resulting in a downward shift of the "labour demand curve".
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, Gordon shows that the new equilibrium position will involve the original level of labour productivity and even lower employment. Consequently, the traditionally expected [positive] trade-off between unemployment and productivity would not be observed.
The main point of this paper is that in an international context, what matters for the evolution of employment [and the unemployment rate] is not the absolute growth rate of a country's capital stock, but its evolution relative to other countries' capital stock. In other words, this paper explains the medium-to long-term variations [caused by differential rates of capital accumulation] around the untrended very long-term unemployment rate brought to the attention of the profession by LNJ [1991] . To understand the intuition generating such a conclusion, consider an oligopolistic setting in which domestic firms are competing with foreign firms. If firms compete in quantities [the Cournot-Nash solution], then increases in the domestic capital stock [which increase labour productivity] will -by reducing the marginal cost of domestic firms -increase domestic output and reduce foreign output and employment. However the effect on domestic employment is ambiguous since it depends on the net result of the employment gains associated with higher domestic output and the employment loses [at the same level of output] due to increased productivity. By contrast, increases in the foreign capital stock, would result in decreases in the marginal cost of foreign firms and in reductions of domestic output and employment. In this sense the trade-off between unemployment and productivity [or the capital stock] may even be negative. A country may need high growth rates in its capital stock to avoid the loss of market share which would be a result of increases in foreign capital stock [and productivity]. Figure 1 illustrates the empirical importance of the above statement very clearly. Given the widely differing experience between Europe and Japan over unemployment on the one hand, and the growth rate of the capital stock, on the other, we choose to focus our empirical investigation on three countries: Germany, United
Kingdom [as representatives of the European experience] and Japan. For each of the above countries, the vertical axes in Figure 1 
CAPITAL STOCKS AND EMPLOYMENT IN PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
Consider a two country model with each economy consisting of many sectors.
We first examine one sector in isolation. We assume that there is a unified world market for the product of this sector in which n [identical] domestic and n [identical] foreign firms behave as Cournot oligopolists. The market demand curve facing domestic and foreign firms in this sector is
where P is the price of the product and X i ; i=1,2 is the output [and sales] of each of the n domestic and n foreign firms, respectively. The capital stock K i , which each firms uses is taken as exogenous and the user cost of capital is denoted by r. We assume further that both sets of firms have similar cost structures. In particular, we assume that there are economies of scale which arise from the existence of a fixed cost in terms of labour which must be incurred to start producing. This is expressed as
where N i is the amount of labour required to produce X i units of output by each firm in country i, γ i is the fixed cost of labour input in country i, and δ i (K i ) is the marginal input-output coefficient which depends [negatively] on the capital stock used by each firm. For any given level of the capital stock, equation (2) implies that the marginal cost is constant but the average cost is declining. The term δ i (K i ) captures the extent to which a higher capital stock succeeds in increasing the productivity of labour.
The profit function of each firm can be written as
where w i stands for the given wage rate. The Cournot-Nash solution to this oligopoly game predicts that the output level of each domestic and foreign firm will be equal to
From equations (4) and (5) we observe that an increase in the domestic firms' capital stock will increase their output and reduce the output of their foreign rivals.
The effects of changes in the capital stock on employment are not so clear-cut however. We find that
We observe that an increase in the capital stock of each domestic firm will result -ceteris paribus -in a reduction in employment for every foreign firm, whereas it has an ambiguous effect on domestic employment. This ambiguity stems from the fact that fewer workers are now needed to produce the old level of output. The increase in domestic output may thus not be large enough to provide employment for those that would lose their jobs if domestic output had remained constant. From equations (6) and (7) we can also observe that the higher is the number of firms, the more likely it becomes that [dN 1 /dK 1 ] and [dN 2 /dK 2 ] are positive. This follows since as the number of firms increases [i.e. as the situation becomes closer to perfect competition], the larger is the increase in the total output of domestic firms generated by a decrease in the marginal cost. Productivity increases or technical progress are thus more likely to lead to increases in domestic employment the larger is the degree of competition between firms.
On the basis of the above partial equilibrium results one may be tempted to conclude that equivalent increases in the capital stock of both domestic and foreign firms are not likely to result in increases in either domestic or foreign employment.
Consider, for example, a symmetric case in which domestic and foreign firms are
Then we find that
Even though this expression appears to be ambiguous, note that α denotes the and K 2 would result in a fall in employment in the sector producing this good in both countries.
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
The first thing that must be taken into account with respect to the previous analysis in a macroeconomic setting is the assumed constancy of the market demand curve [equation (1)]. If, following from the previous symmetric example, K 1 and K 2 increase by the same amount, from equations (4) and (5) (6) and (8) explained in terms of the increased ability that workers have to push up wages when the unemployment rate is low or alternatively by the observation that firms offer high wages when the unemployment rate is low. The latter is explained by the firm's desire to limit shirking and quits by their employees. The position of this schedule dependsamongst other things -on labour productivity. A higher level of the capital stock is expected to shift the WS schedule upwards. LNJ [1991] argue that it is such increases in wage demands on the part of workers which offset the positive effects of a higher capital stock on employment. In our context, an increase in the foreign capital stockfor a given level of the domestic capital stock -will have no effect on the position of the wage setting schedule. It will, nevertheless, effect a movement along this schedule, thereby only partly offsetting the negative effect on domestic employment. And to the extent that the upward shift of the foreign wage setting curve does not further erode the increase in competitiveness of the foreign country, there will be an increase in the domestic unemployment rate. Equiproportional increases in the domestic and foreign capital stock essentially move both countries upwards along a vertical long-run wagesetting curve. Real wages increase in both countries but the unemployment rate in the very long-term is unaffected. The analysis becomes only slightly more complicated if we allow both countries' capital stocks to grow but at unequal rates. In this case there would be an upward shift in the wage setting schedules of both countries and as long as the growth rate of the foreign country's capital stock is larger, the domestic
[foreign] unemployment rate will be expected to increase [fall] .
Up to this point we have assumed that the labour force is constant. It is obvious that an increase in the capital stock may induce a larger proportion of the population to enter the labour market, through its effects on wages described earlier 5 .
In such a case even if the result of increases in the relative capital stock of the domestic country is increased employment, the unemployment rate may not fall 6 . In Section 4
we examine to what extent the evolution of competitiveness and the labour force can either augment or supplant the negative relationship appearing in Figure 1 between the unemployment rate and relative capital accumulation.
III. EMPIRICAL LINK BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
To facilitate a detailed quantitative analysis of the relationship between the unemployment rate, ur and the growth rate in the relative capital stock, rk we first examine simple bivariate scatter plots [see Figure 2 ] 7 for each country. The rk measure is defined as The above scatter plots clearly reveal that the relationship between ur and rk is where, α, β, and γ p are the parameters to be estimated and L is the lag operator. From the scatter plots and units of measure in Figure 2 , α and β are both expected to be negative.
Two aspects regarding the specification of (12) are noteworthy. First, a dynamic as opposed to a static model has been employed to capture the inherent delays between capital formation 11 and its effect on the unemployment rate. In other words, we allow for the effects of rk on ur to be distributed over a number of time periods.
Since we do not have apriori information regarding the shape of the lag distribution, the number of time periods, p, will be determined statistically instead of being imposed.
Note that estimating the lag structure in this fashion provides more flexibility than the simple geometric lag model since it allows for initial change(s) in the lag weight(s) before they taper off and approach zero 12 .
Second, in contrast to the scatter plots which are in terms of contemporaneous ur and rk, the above model incorporates a one period lag of rk. Although we clearly sacrifice some efficiency by opting for the predetermined value of rk, our aim is to avoid inconsistent parameter estimates arising from the potential endogeneity of contemporaneous rk. While the endogeneity or exogeneity of rk is commonly treated as a testable assumption, Davidson and McKinnon [1993] Since the DWH test 13 requires application of NIV, we need to obtain a valid set of instruments which are correlated with rk t but orthogonal to ε t . Unfortunately, we found the conclusions resulting from application of the DWH test statistic, to be quite sensitive to our choice of instruments 14 . Accordingly our decision to use predetermined rk in (12) with the associated efficiency loss, is a risk averse one reflecting the uncertainty regarding the effect that the potential endogenity of contemporaneous rk has on the NLS parameter estimates.
The estimated dynamic models set out in (12) for Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom are reported above in Table 1 . As expected, the estimated values of α and β are negative and [more importantly] significant for all countries. Additionally, the models appear to be performing quite satisfactorily with respect to the diagnostic tests of specification and misspecification. To ensure (i) that the significance of predetermined rk was robust to the exclusion of predetermined values of ur and (ii) that the lagged values of ur were not explaining most of the variance in contemporaneous ur, we also estimated the static version of (12). From the R 2 's reported in Table 1 we can see that the static model also provides a remarkably good fit to ur and rk data. are still significant at the 1% level. Given the nonlinear functional form employed in the basic dynamic model, to discover how changes in the rate of relative capital accumulation effects the unemployment rate in the steady-state, we need to simulate the model for each country. Our simulations show the effects on the unemployment rate resulting from a Given that both the values of the estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors depend on the covariance between the conditioning variables, a robust outcome to the above variable selection procedure relies on the lack of high correlation between the regressors. Examination of the correlations in Table 2 reveals that the stepwise search procedure should produce sensible outcomes in that the variables considered are orthogonal to one another. Further evidence supporting this conclusion is presented below where we provide a comparison of the outcomes of the stepwise selection method with those from a general-to-specific selection strategy. (1) due to the lack of labour force data.
-As in Table 1 , the number of lags, p in the basic dynamic model is determined statistically.
-The numbers in square brackets are probability values used to determine the significance of the heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. Tables 3 and 4 report the first and final stages of applying the stepwise regression procedure described above. Examination of Table 3 shows, with the exception of competitiveness for Japan, that none of the additional conditioning variables enters the basic dynamic model in equation (12) at the 5% significance level.
Additionally none of the variables from the basic dynamic model are variance dominated or rendered insignificant by the inclusion of the extra regressors. 1965(3)-1995(4) U. K. 1961(4)-1995(4) - § Given the extremely small changes in a , b , and g for Japan reported in this Table relative to their values in Table 1 [i.e. when competitiveness is excluded], re-simulating the model reported in Figure 4 , not surprisingly, does not produce discernibly different results.
- § This regression starts in 1962(4) instead of 1961(2) since competitiveness is not available prior to 1962(3).
Continuing with the forward and backward selection procedure described above for Japan yields the final model reported in Table 4 which shows that only competitiveness is retained. In addition to the shorter time period used for the estimation in Table 3 , [due to insufficient labour force data], Table 4 also reports the estimations for the longer time period used in Table 1 . The latter is possible since the labour force is not an included regressor in any of the models.
In contrast to the above variable selection strategy, in Table 5 is less than in Table 1 and (ii) the number of regressors has increased. However, several points regarding the estimates in Table 5 
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